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Kevin L. Kliesen and Daniel L. Thornton
Each year, the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) publishes its Budget and Economic Outlook. The CBO’s
deficit projections for the current fiscal year (FY) and the next 10 FYs are widely followed because they
provide an assessment of the medium-term budget outlook based on current law and a presumed path
for the economy over the next decade. Admittedly, this task is more difficult because of the required
assumption that the laws governing future outlays and revenues do not change. Nevertheless, given its
nonpartisan nature and the CBO’s well-respected staff of professional economists and budget analysts,
its projections are closely followed. In this article, the authors update their 2001 assessment of the accu-
racy of the CBO’s short- and medium-term budget projections by adding an additional 10 years of data.
Such analysis is useful in light of the dramatic change in actual and expected fiscal policy, especially
over the past few years. In addition, they investigate the extent to which the CBO’s projection errors are
affected by errors in forecasting key economic variables and the extent to which the errors relate more
to inaccurate projections of revenues or expenditures. (JEL H60, H62, H68)
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I
n 2000, after more than 40 years of nearly consecutive budget deficits, both the White
House Office of Management and Budget and the Congressional Budget Office (CBO)
projected decade-long budget surpluses. Moreover, both agencies projected that publicly
held government debt (then about $3.5 trillion) would be eliminated by 2010. The advent of
potentially large budget surpluses, naturally, caused economists and market participants to
consider potential changes to market-making activity associated with the all-important Treasury
securities market.1 In addition, some Federal Reserve officials began to speculate about how
the Federal Open Market Committee would conduct open market operations without an ade-
quate supply of Treasury securities.2
In response to the projections of large budget surpluses, we (Kliesen and Thornton, 2001)
analyzed the accuracy of these government agencies in projecting government deficits. Using
CBO deficit projections over the period 1976-99, we found that the deficit projections beyond a
year were unreliable. Importantly, we found that the projections were biased in the direction of
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that “If the current projections are biased to a similar degree and policymakers choose to alter
current tax and spending programs based on these projections, it is possible that the projected
surpluses will never materialize” (p. 22).
Our conclusion proved accurate. Rather than being eliminated as projected, publicly held
government debt increased to over $9 trillion by 2010. Much of the recent increase was a conse-
quence of the government’s attempt to ameliorate the effects of the financial crisis on output
and employment; however, the failure of the projected surpluses to materialize was not the con-
sequence of an unforeseen financial crisis. Publicly held government debt had increased to over
$5 trillion before the crisis. After 2000, revenues began to decline and expenditures began to rise
and the projected surpluses morphed into actual deficits. Figure 1 shows this changein the federal
surplus/deficit as a percent of gross national product (GNP) or gross domestic product (GDP)
since 1800. The blue dashed line shows the CBO’s budget projections from 2000. The figure
shows there were relatively large deficits before 2009. The vertical line denotes 2011, and the
black dashed line shows the CBO’s January 2011 budget projections over the next 10 years. The
CBO projects that the deficit will stabilize at about 3 percent of GDP by 2021, according to its
baseline projections.3
Current budget projections are the polar opposite of a decade ago: Over the past few years,
U.S. budget deficits have been at levels previously attained only during the Civil War and the
two world wars. Accordingly, in January 2011 the CBO projected that these large, unsustainable
deficits would fall to more modest, although still historically large, levels over themedium term.
However, since publication of the CBO’s January 2011 baseline budget projections, the Budget
Control Act of 2011 was signed into law in August 2011.4 According to the CBO, the act will
potentially reduce the cumulative budget deficit by $2.1 trillion over fiscal years (FYs) 2012 to
2021. Accordingly, in the CBO’s baseline budget projections published in August 2011, the budget
deficit as a share of GDP is projected to decline from about 9 percent in FY 2010 to 1.8 percent
in FY 2021. In the January 2011 baseline, the CBO projected that the budget deficitwould decline
to 3.2 percent by 2021. 
How much confidence should the public and policymakers place in these new projections?
As noted in our previous analysis, when the CBO constructs its baseline projections it cannot—
unlike private-sector forecasters—anticipate future changes in fiscal or monetary policy that
affect future economic growth, outlays, and revenues. Instead, the CBO by law uses what is known
as a “current services baseline.” That is, it must assume that existing laws that govern outlays
and receipts will prevail over the projection horizon. However, unexpected actions by policy-
makers to increase spending or change taxes are important sources of budget projection errors.
Of course, this handicap is only one source of projection error. Model misspecification, which
may bias the forecast of important economic variables, such as real GDP growth and inflation,
and inaccurate demographic projections obtained from other government agencies are other
sources of error.5 In short, the CBO has a difficult task. Nevertheless, policymakers and others
rely on its budget projections, which are generally viewed as an unbiased assessment of the
medium-term budget outlook by market analysts.
This article provides an updated assessment of the accuracy of these budget projections in
light of the dramatic change in actual and expected fiscal policy over the past few years. Specifi  -
cally, we investigate whether a change has occurred in the accuracy and the bias of the CBO’s
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analysis investigates the extent to which the CBO’s projection errors are affected by errors in
CBO forecasts of key economic variables, something we were unable to do in our previous work
because the sample was too short. In addition, we decompose projection errors into revenue
and expenditure errors, and further by the source of the revenue and expenditures errors, in an
attempt to provide insight about the likely sign and magnitude of the errors associated with the
current deficit projections. Our analysis begins with a discussion of U.S. deficits historically,
focusing on the experience during the post-WWII period.
THE HISTORY OF U.S. DEFICITS
Figure 1 shows that large deficits relative to GDP have historically been associated with wars:
the War of 1812, the Civil War, and World Wars I and II. By comparison with these wars, the
deficits associated with the Korean, Vietnam, and Gulf wars were modest. The United States
began running relatively large and persistent deficits in the 1970s. In the 24 years from 1947
through 1970, the average deficit as a percent of GDP was zero. In contrast, in the 37 years from
1971 through 2007, the average deficit as a percent of GDP was 2.5 percent. Moreover, there were
only 4 years (10.1 percent of the years) during the latter period when there was a surplus com-
pared with 10 years (41.7 percent of the years) in the earlier period. 
An important question is why has the government run large and persistent deficits since
1971? We cannot answer that question per se, but we can ascertain whether large and persistent
deficits are associated with increases in expenditures or decreases in revenue or some combina-
tion of both. Figure 2 shows government expenditures and revenues as a percent of GDP since
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Figure 3
The U.S. Cyclically Adjusted Budget Deficit
SOURCE: Congressional Budget Office.Kliesen and Thornton
1946. From the early 1950s until the late 1960s, revenues and expenditures were a relatively con-
stant percent of GDP. From 1950 through 1970, revenue averaged 17.6 percent of GDP, while
expenditures were only slightly higher, 18.2 percent. In contrast, from 1971 through 2007, revenue
averaged 18.2 percent of GDP, while expenditures averaged 20.6 percent. Indeed, the difference
between revenues and expenditures, 2.4 percent, is nearly equal to the 2.5 percent average deficit
as a percent of GDP over the period. Hence, essentially the entire average deficit over the 1971-
2007 period can be attributed to an increase in expenditures relative to revenues.6
In response to persistently larger budget deficits, Congress enacted several reforms to the
discretionary side of the budget process, such as the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Balanced Budget
and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985 and the Budget Enforcement Act of 1990, which
instituted “pay-as-you-go” (PAYGO) rules.7 None of these reforms has permanently reduced
the deficit to its pre-1971 levels, though they may have had a temporary effect. Indeed, as seen
by the cyclically adjusted (structural) budget deficit (Figure 3), the structural budget deficit
increased from a little less than 1 percent of potential GDP in 1962 to a little less than 5 percent
of potential GDP in 1986.8 The structural deficit then declined, reaching a positive 1 percent in
2000, before falling sharply thereafter.
The previous analysis provides little insight into why government spending increasedduring
the period. Considering the source of revenues and expenditures offers some insight into this
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Federal Government Receipts by Category (1948-2010)
SOURCE: Office of Management and Budget.issue. Figure 4 presents five sources of government revenue as a percent of GDP since 1948.
Although total revenue as a percent of GDP has remained relatively constant since1950 (as noted
above), the figure shows the source of revenue has not. The federal government’s main sources
of revenue are individual income tax receipts, payroll taxes (to fund mandatory programs such
as Social Security and Medicare), corporate income taxes, and excise taxes (such as those on
gasoline or airfares). Individual income tax receipts and other tax receipts have been relatively
constant—about 8 percent and 1 percent of GDP, respectively—but the other sources of revenue
have changed considerably. Corporate income and excise taxes declined until the mid-1980s and
have since remained relatively constant at about 2 percent and 1 percent of GDP, respectively.
As these sources of revenue were declining, social insurance and retirement revenue increased
from about 1 percent of GDP in 1948 to nearly 7 percent of GDP in late 1988 and stabilized at
about that level.
The composition of government expenditures has also changed substantially. Figure 5 shows
the composition of government expenditures by category since 1948. Net interest expenses and
other federal spending have fluctuated around 2 percent of GDP over the period. In contrast,
after increasing dramatically during the Korean War, defense and international-related spend-
ing has trended down and fluctuated in the range of 5 to 6 percent of GDP. Indeed, defense
spending as a percent of GDP in 2010 (5.1 percent) is nearly identical to what it was in 1948 (5.3
percent). The large spending increases occurred in mandatory outlays, more than half of which
is Social Security benefits and Medicare expenditures financed by payroll taxes paid by employ-
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Federal Government Expenditures by Category (1948-2010)
SOURCE: Office of Management and Budget.ees and employers.9 Mandatory spending increased from 3.5 percent of GDP in 1948 to nearly
16 percent of GDP in 2010. Much of the recent increase appears to be associated with the surge
in unemployment benefits in the wake of the financial crisis. From December 2007 to October
2009, the unemployment rate rose from 5 percent to 10.1 percent. With a stubbornly high unem-
ployment rate, Congress enacted several extensions of benefits for those unemployed beyond
the normal 26 weeks. However, even before the financial crisis, mandatory spending had risen
to 12 percent of GDP. Indeed, nearly all of the persistent deficits since 1971 can be attributed to
(i) increased spending rather than a decline in revenue and (ii) the fact that the increased spend-
ing is in the mandatory component.
THE ACCURACY OF THE CBO’S BUDGET PROJECTIONS
The government’s attempt to mitigate the effects of the financial crisis resulted in very large
deficits in 2009 and 2010: 9.9 percent and 8.9 percent of GDP, respectively. Despite a weaker-
than-expected pace of economic growth in 2011, in its August update the CBO projected that
the budget deficit would fall to 8.5 percent of GDP for 2011. As previously mentioned, the CBO’s
January 2011 baseline projection was that the budget deficit would rise to 9.8 percent of GDP in
2011. This illustrates that reports issued less than a year apart can yield significantly different
projections for the deficit.
We provide some insight into the usefulness of these projections by examining thehistorical
accuracy of the CBO’s baseline budget projections, which are typically published in January. We
do not incorporate into our analysis the mid-term projections, which are typically published in
the summer about the same time as the Office of Management and Budget’sMid-Session Review.
Our analysis focuses on 1-year-ahead projection errors and cumulative 5-year-ahead projection
errors. Five years is a reasonable planning horizon for policymakers and a period overwhich pro-
jections might be considered reliable. Figure 6 shows the actual and CBO-projected5-year cumu-
lative budget surplus/deficit as a percent of GDP. The 45-degree line denotes the pointsof equality
between the actual and projected outcomes. If the projections were accurate, all pointswould fall
on the 45-degree line. Consistent with our 2001 analysis, Figure 6 shows that the 5-yearcumula-
tive projections are highly inaccurate: The average absolute projection error is 2.65 percentof GDP.
Moreover, most observations lie below the 45-degree line (20 of the 30 observations are below
the line), indicating a strong bias in underprojecting the deficit (overprojecting the surplus).
A common benchmark for evaluating forecast accuracy is to compare model-basedforecasts
with a simple random walk (RW) forecast. The latter assumes that next year’s value of the fore-
casted series is equal to the current year’s value—that is, the series cannot be forecasted beyond
its current value. We compare the accuracy of the CBO projections relative to the projection
errors from a RW projection model. The RW model projects the cumulative 5-year budget bal-
ance to be equal to the actual cumulative 5-year budget balance of the previous 5 years. In order
to be operational, the CBO would have had to have known the cumulative budget balance over
the past 5 years; however, for projections made in year t, the CBO would know onlythe cumula-
tive 5-year budget in year t. Hence, the RW projections made in year t–1 are based on the actual
cumulative 5-year budget through year t–1. For example, the RW cumulative 5-year deficit pro-
jections made in 1976 (i.e., the cumulative 5-year deficit projections for the period 1977 through
1981) are the actual cumulative 5-year deficit over the period 1971 through 1975.
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Actual and CBO-Projected 5-Year Cumulative Budget Surplus/Deficit as a Percent of GDPFigure 7 shows the actual and RW cumulative 5-year budget projections over our sample
period. The scale is identical to that of Figure 6 to facilitate comparison of the CBO and RW
projections. A comparison of Figures 6 and 7 suggest that, on average, the RW projections are
somewhat better than the CBO’s. For example, there are no observations in the upper left quad-
rant (projected deficit, actual surplus) and appreciably fewer observations in the bottom right
quadrant (projected surplus, actual deficit) of Figure 7 compared with Figure 6. We can test
whether this difference is statistically significant by calculating the root mean square projection
error (RMSPE) and the mean absolute projection error (MAPE). The RMSPE and MAPE are
10.7 percent and 2.7 percent for the CBO, compared with 5.7 percent and 2.1 percent for the
RW projections. Though large, the difference in the two RMSPEs is not statistically significant
at the 5 percent significance level. The difference in MAPE is smaller and likewise not statisti-
cally significant.10
Figure 8 shows the CBO and RW cumulative 5-year projection errors for each year of the
sample period. The RW projection errors have been smaller almost every year; nevertheless, the
figure suggests that much of the dominance of the RW projections occurred before 1990. Since
then the RW projections have been only slightly smaller than the CBO projections. The RMSPE
and MAPE are 8.4 percent and 2.5 percent for the CBO compared with 7.1 percent and 2.3 per-
cent for the RW. Again, these differences are not statistically significant.
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Cumulative 5-Year Projection Errors: CBO and Random Walk ProjectionsAccuracy of CBO Projections One Year Ahead
Not surprisingly, the CBO’s 1-year-ahead projections are more accurate thanthe cumulative
5-year projections. The relevant question, however, is this: Are they better than RW projections?
Figure 9 shows the CBO and RW projection errors over the period 1976 though 2010. The figure
strongly suggests that even at the 1-year projection horizon the RW model’s projection errors
are smaller than the CBO’s. Indeed, the RMSPE and MAPE are 2.2 percent and 1.5 percent, and
1.6 percent and 1.1 percent for the CBO and RW projections, respectively. These differences are
relatively small in absolute terms and are not statistically significant.
Of course, some of these differences are a consequence of the large errors made by the CBO
(and other private forecasters) in the wake of the financial crisis. However, the RW projection
errors are smaller than the CBO’s even over the period 1976 through 2007—the RMSPE and
MAPE are 1.6 percent and 1.1 percent, and 1.1 percent and 0.9 percent, for the CBO and RW
projections, respectively. These results suggest that the CBO could have done as well by simply
assuming that next year’s budget surplus/deficit would be the same as last year’s.
It is reasonable to believe that the relatively poor performance of the CBO’s cumulative 5-year
projections can be accounted for (i) by structural changes in the economy that are extremely
difficult—if not impossible—to predict or (ii) swings in the government’s tax and expenditure
policy that are not accounted for in the baseline projections. However, the relatively poor per-
formance of 1-year-ahead projections is more difficult to ascribe to such factors. More recently,
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Supplemental Spending Hampers CBO’s Budget Projections
Typically, the CBO releases its Budget and Economic Outlook for the current FY and the next 10 FYs at the beginning of each calendar year.
These budget projections are widely followed because they provide an assessment of the medium-term budget outlook based on current
law and a presumed path for the economy over the next decade. The CBO’s budget projections thus depend importantly on (i) current
budgetary laws that govern federal outlays and tax receipts and (ii) its own economic forecasts.
When the CBO publishes its budget projections for the upcoming FY, it does not know the composition of the FY 2013 budget.* Moreover,
it does not know what—if any—additional federal spending in calendar year 2011 will occur that may affect the existing FY 2012 budget
projections (made a year earlier). As the accompanying table shows, these additional outlays—termed supplemental appropriations—can
be significant.† According to the table, supplemental appropriations were rather small from 1990 to 1998, averaging a little less than $14
billion per FY. However, this spending averaged about 41 percent of the average projected budget balance over the period ($–192 billion).
From 1999 to 2001 (the period when the budget surplus projections materialized), the average annual supplemental appropriation rose
modestly to about $20 billion per year, or about 10 percent of the average surplus projection. From this standpoint, it does not appear
that the budget surpluses spurred Congress to undertake spending beyond what was appropriated in that year’s budget.
The table shows that the largest amount of supplemental expenditures occurred from 2002 to 2009. Over this period, the average annual
supplemental appropriation was slightly less than $125 billion per year, nearly 95 percent of the average annual projected budget deficit
($–261 billion). These supplemental expenditures (associated with the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan and a few severe natural disasters,
such as Hurricane Katrina) can help explain the CBO’s relatively poor budget projections over this period.
Should Congress continue to use supplemental appropriations in the future to the same degree as it did over this period, economists,
budget analysts, and policymakers would be wise to consider this development when trying to ascertain the near-term fiscal outlook
provided by the CBO or the White House Office of Management and Budget. In FY 2010, though, supplemental appropriations fell by more
than two-thirds from the previous year, perhaps a reflection of the public’s increasing concern over the size of the federal budget deficit.
Supplemental Appropriations and Initial Budget Projections
Supplemental appropriations  Initial budget projection  Supplemental spending as a percent of 
Fiscal year  ($ billions) ($ billions)  initial deficit/surplus projection
1990 6.4 –138.0 –4.6
1991 48.6 –298.0 –16.3
1992 19.7 –327.0 –6.0
1993 10.4 –291.0 –3.6
1994 13.5 –171.0 –7.9
1995 6.4 –207.0 –3.1
1996 4.5 –171.0 –2.6
1997 8.9 –120.0 –7.4
1998 6.3 –2.0 –313.9
1999 13.4 131.0 10.2
2000 17.4 177.0 9.8
2001 29.9 313.0 9.6
2002 47.7 –14.0 –340.4
2003 81.1 –145.0 –55.9
2004 117.8 –362.0 –32.6
2005 161.9 –295.0 –54.9
2006 128.5 –270.0 –47.6
2007 120.9 –98.0 –123.4
2008 139.0 –198.0 –70.2
2009 196.8 –703.0 –28.0
2010 56.4 –980.0 –5.8
NOTE: Excludes rescissions. The budget projection is typically published in January of the prior year in the CBO Budget andEconomic Update.
SOURCE: History of Supplemental Appropriations; www.cbo.gov/publications/collections/collections.cfm?collect=3.
*Fiscal year 2013 begins on October 1, 2012, and ends on September 30, 2013.
†These appropriations exclude rescissions, which were amounts budgeted but not spent.the CBO’s larger 1-year projections may also reflect, as noted in the shaded insert, the signifi-
cant amount of supplemental expenditures after 2001.
The Sensitivity of CBO Projection Errors to Economic Shocks
This section investigates the sensitivity of CBO projection errors to economic shocks in two
ways. First, we evaluate the CBO’s projection errors by excluding recession periods. It is reason-
able to assume that the CBO’s near-term projection errors are heavily influenced by thebehavior
of the economy. The difficulty in forecasting recessions is widely acknowledged and reflected in
the fact that nearly all U.S. recessions have been “called” several months after they actually
began.11 Hence, it is reasonable to assume that projection errors are considerably higher during
recessions. To investigate the extent to which CBO projections are affected by recessions, we
deleted all years with a recession during any month of the projection year. Specifically,we deleted
1980-82, 1990-91, 2001-02, and 2008-09. The RMSPE and MAPE for the non-recession years
are 1.42 percent and 1.01 percent, respectively, smaller than the 1.58 percent and 1.48 percent
for the period 1976-2010. Indeed, the differences in the RMSPE and MAPE between recession
and non-recession years are highly statistically significant. The projections from the RW model
are also larger during recession years but the difference is not statistically significant.
In the process of making its budget projections, the CBO forecasts certain important eco-
nomic variables. It is possible that the CBO’s budget errors are linked to its economic forecast
errors. For example, if real GDP growth is weaker than the CBO forecasted, the CBO budget
projection could be lower than projected. We investigate this possibility by regressing the CBO’s
budget projection errors on its forecast errors for four economic variables over the same period:
real GDP growth, the unemployment rate, the 3-month T-bill rate, and the 10-year Treasury
bond yield. The CBO has published its forecasts for these variables since 1984. For example, in
January 1984 the CBO made economic forecasts for these variables for FY 1985. This forecast is
then compared with the FY 1985 actual estimate to determine the FY 1985 forecast error. The
sample period is too short to analyze the effects of forecast errors on the CBO’s5-year cumulative
projections. Consequently, our analysis focuses on the 1-year-ahead projections. The economic
data are based on FYs rather than calendar years. Specifically, we estimate
(1)
where CBOt denotes the CBO’s 1-year-ahead budget projection error for year t, and gdpt, urt,
tb3t, and T10t denote the CBO’s 1-year ahead forecast errors for the growth rate of real GDP, the
unemployment rate, the 3-month T-bill rate, and the 10-year Treasury bond yield, respectively.
The results are summarized in Table 1, which reports the estimated coefficients, their corre-
sponding significance level (p-value), the estimate of the adjusted R2(R –2), andthe standard error
of the equation (SE). When all forecast errors are included, none of thecoefficients is statistically
significant at any reasonable significance level; however, each coefficient is statistically signifi-
cant at at least the 10 percent significance level when considered alone. The estimate of R –2 is very
small for the T10 forecast errors and is largest for the unemployment rate. Indeed, none of the
other coefficients is statistically significant when included with the unemployment rate. This
point is illustrated in the last two columns of the table, which show the results when both gdp
CBO gdp ur tb T t t t t t t =+ + + + + αδ δ δ δ ε 1 2 3 4 3 10 ,
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uris included alone, suggesting that gdphas no marginal explanatory power in thepresence of ur.
Asimilar result holds for tb3and T10. Hence, the CBO’s economic forecast errors, as summarized
by the unemployment rate, appear to be related to its 1-year-ahead projection errors. Moreover,
the sign of the coefficient is consistent with the idea that a higher unemployment rate than the
CBO’s forecast should yield a smaller surplus (or larger deficit) relative to the CBO’s projection.
It is important to emphasize, however, that correlation does not imply causation—that is, it
does not necessarily mean that the larger budget projection error was caused by the CBO’s eco-
nomic forecast error. We investigate this by repeating the analysis using the RW budget projec-
tion errors. If there is no similar relationship between the CBO’s economic forecast errors and
the RW budget projection errors, the hypothesis that the CBO’s budget projection errors were
affected by its economic forecast errors has more credibility. If, on the other hand, the results
are materially similar to those using the CBO’s budget projection errors, it is unlikely that the
correlations reported for the CBO’s budget projection errors reflect a cause-and-effect relation-
ship between economic forecast errors and budget projection errors.
Kliesen and Thornton
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Table 1
Estimates of Equation (1) with CBO Projection Errors
Coef. p-Value Coef. p-Value Coef. p-Value Coef. p-Value Coef. p-Value Coef. p-Value
Constant –0.269 0.285 –0.095 0.815 –0.372 0.338 0.254 0.502 0.311 0.455 –0.340 0.369
gdp 0.327 0.270 0.498 0.023 0.176 0.294
ur –0.497 0.415 –1.118 0.000 –0.965 0.000
tb3 0.332 0.421 0.420 0.015
T10 –0.441 0.338 0.551 0.058
R –2 0.330 0.208 0.375 0.224 0.044 0.364
SE 1.358 0.170 1.311 1.461 1.622 1.322
NOTE: Analysis based on annual data, 1985 to 2010. Coef., coefficient.
Table 2
Estimates of Equation (1) with Random Walk Projection Errors
Coef. p-Value Coef. p-Value Coef. p-Value Coef. p-Value Coef. p-Value Coef. p-Value
Constant –0.031 0.887 0.005 0.985 –0.191 0.375 0.264 0.197 0.357 0.155 –0.182 0.402
gdp 0.105 0.569 0.297 0.054 0.052 0.659
ur –0.470 0.247 –0.780 0.000 –0.735 0.001
tb3 0.154 0.595 0.317 0.011
T10 –0.052 0.881 0.490 0.033
R –2 0.412 0.145 0.464 0.339 0.131 0.442
SE 0.806 0.973 1.770 0.856 0.980 0.786
NOTE: Analysis based on annual data, 1985 to 2010. Coef., coefficient.The results using the RW projection errors as the dependent variable are summarized in
Table 2. All qualitative conclusions described for the CBO’s projection errors apply to the RW
projection errors as well. Indeed, the most notable difference is that the estimates of R –2 are some-
what higher for the RW errors. Hence, there is no compelling evidence that the CBO’s budget
projections could have been materially improved had its forecasting of the unemployment rate
or other economic variables been significantly better.
HAS THE CBO DONE BETTER RECENTLY?
In our previous work we evaluated the CBO’s budget deficit projections over the period
1976-94. It is possible that, despite its well-known handicaps in the projection process, the CBO
may have reduced its projection errors over the most recent period. To investigatethis possibility
we compare the CBO’s 1-year-ahead projections over the periods 1976-94 and 1995-2007; 2008,
2009, and 2010 were omitted so the results would not be affected by the unanticipated financial
crisis. The RMSPE and MAPE for the latter period are 2.0 percent and 1.5 percent, respectively,
compared with 1.2 percent and 0.9 percent, respectively, for the earlier period.12 Hence, the
accuracy of the CBO’s projections appears to have deteriorated in the most recent period. How  -
ever, despite their relatively large size, these differences are not statistically significant.
The RW projection errors are also larger over the latter period; however, the deterioration
in performance is smaller. Moreover, the difference in performance between the RW and CBO
projections for the most recent period is statistically significant at the 5 percentsignificance level
for the MAPE and statistically significant at a slightly higher significance level for the RMSPE.
Hence, the accuracy of the CBO projection has deteriorated recently both absolutely and relative
to the RW benchmark. Consequently, there is no reason to place more faith in the CBO’s budget
projections now than there was a decade ago. If anything, the evidence suggests that slightly
more skepticism of the CBO’s projections in recent years may be warranted. 
Essentially no change occurred in the bias of the CBO’s 5-year-ahead projection errors dur-
ing the most recent decade. The average underprojection of the deficit in the recent decade is
1.30 percent of GDP compared with 1.35 percent of GDP over the previous period. The 5-year-
ahead bias is most likely to be important since this period is a reasonable planning period of
reductions in the fiscal deficit. For example, this bias suggests that deficit reduction programs
that are projected to reduce the federal deficit by 1 percent of GDP over the next five years rela-
tive to the CBO’s projections may miss their mark by more than 1 percent of GDP. Stated differ-
ently, the CBO is currently projecting the deficit to stabilize at less than 2 percent of GDP
(according to the August 2011 baseline projections), but the bias suggests that the actual budget
deficit could be considerably higher.
DECOMPOSING THE BUDGET PROJECTION ERRORS
It is interesting to know whether the CBO’s budget projection errors are due to the relative
inability to accurately project revenues or expenditures and, if so, which category of revenue or
expenditures. Because cumulative 5-year projection errors overlap over time, we focus on the
1-year forecast errors; however, the qualitative implications are similar using the cumulative 
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as a percent of GDP. The expenditure errors are plotted on the horizontal axis, while therevenue
errors are plotted on the vertical axis. Points on or near the 45-degree line denote years in which
the CBO did a good job of projecting both revenues and expenditures. Points nearthe horizontal
zero line denote years when the CBO did a relatively good job of projecting revenues, while points
near the vertical zero line denote years when the CBO did a relatively good job of projecting
expenditures. Points in the upper left quadrant of the figure indicate years whenthe CBO under-
projected revenue and overprojected expenditures; points in the lower right quadrant indicate
the reverse.
While it is not obvious from the figure, on average the CBO did somewhat better in project-
ing expenditures. The MAPE is 1.14 percent and 0.76 percent for revenue and expenditure,
respectively. The RMSPE is 1.58 percent and 1.04 percent, respectively. Hence, even though the
relatively large and persistent deficits since the early 1970s are due to an increase in expenditures
over revenue, the CBO budget projection errors are somewhat larger for revenue. Indeed, the
performance difference is statistically significant at the 5 percent level for the RMSPE, but not
for the MAPE. It is important to note, however, that the difference in revenue versus expendi-
ture projection performance over the sample period is the consequence of the unusually large
revenue errors associated with the recent recession. When 2008 and 2009 are deleted, the differ-
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Figure 10
CBO Revenue and Expenditure Projection Errors as a Percent of GDPences in these performance measures are small and not statistically significant at any reasonable
significance level.
The Sources of Revenue and Expenditure Errors
In this section, we investigate the sources of the revenue and expenditure projection errors
by examining the CBO’s projection errors for the major categories of revenuesand expenditures.
Specifically, we regressed the CBO’s revenue and expenditure projection errors on three main
sources of revenue and expenditures. The revenue sources are individual income taxes (IND),
corporate income taxes (CORP), and social insurance taxes (SI). The expenditure sources are
mandatory spending (MAN), discretionary spending (DISC), and defense spending (DEF).
Regression analysis is frequently used to make statistical inferences, so it isimportant to empha-
size that the statistics presented here are merely descriptive.
The results are summarized in Table 3. The results for the revenue error regressions are
reported in the upper half of the table. The three sources of revenue errors account for 98 per-
cent of the CBO’s total revenue projection errors. However, only the coefficients on the IND
and CORP are statistically significant. While each component accounts for a relatively large
percentage of the CBO’s revenue projection errors, errors in projecting individual tax returns
appear to be the most important source of error: This error alone accounts for nearly 97 percent
of the total revenue projection errors. In contrast, corporate taxes alone account for only about
33 percent of the variation in revenue errors, and social insurance projection errors account for
even less: about 24 percent.
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Table 3
Regression Analysis of the CBO’s Cumulative 5-Year Revenue and Expenditure Projection Errors
Coef. p-Value Coef. p-Value Coef. p-Value Coef. p-Value
Revenue equation
Constant –0.015 0.521 –0.068 0.392 –0.077 0.756 –0.312 0.298
IND 1.222 0.000 1.471 0.000
CORP 0.855 0.000 2.673 0.000
SI 0.153 0.201 1.493 0.229
R –2 0.978 0.942 0.550 0.125
SE 0.231 0.373 1.042 1.452
Expenditure equation
Constant 0.788 0.000 0.798 0.000 –0.057 0.801 –0.008 0.969
MAN 0.900 0.000 0.922 0.000
DISC 0.678 0.003 1.646 0.002
DEF –1.023 0.000 2.005 0.054
R –2 0.942 0.916 0.395 0.202
SE 0.253 0.306 0.820 0.941
NOTE: Number of observations is 30.The estimates for the expenditure errors are presented in the bottom half of Table 3. Together
the three sources of error account for almost 94 percent of the total expenditure error; however,
only the coefficients on discretionary and defense spending are statistically significant, suggest-
ing that they are individually important sources of expenditure errors.13 This is confirmed by
the fact that, individually, each accounts for about 64 percent of the total variation in the CBO’s
expenditure error. Hence, it appears that none of the three sources of expenditure error was
more important in determining the CBO’s expenditure projection errors.
Unfortunately, this analysis does not point to a specific area where the CBO could improve
its performance as there is no particular source of revenue errors that is more important than
another when the effect of the recent recession on the CBO’s revenue projections is accounted
for. Likewise, there is no dominant source of expenditure error.
CONCLUSION
The CBO’s budget projections are widely followed by economic policymakers, investors,
and other financial participants. In this paper, we analyze 34 years of CBO budget projections in
an attempt to determine the extent to which policymakers and the public should rely on such
projections. It is not our intent to malign the CBO. Rather, our purpose is to ascertain whether
the process that produces the baseline budget projections yields reasonablyaccurate results, given
the constraints they face. Our results suggest several conclusions. First, and not surprisingly,
projections for longer horizons are considerably worse than those for shorter horizons.
Second, despite the better performance at the 1-year horizon, the CBO’s 1-year-ahead pro-
jection errors are not significantly better than the projection errors made by simply using the
previous year’s deficit/surplus as the forecast of the next year’s deficit/surplus. That is, the CBO
could do no worse if it made its 1-year-ahead budget projections using a RW model.
Third, the CBO’s cumulative 5-year projections are considerably worse than projections
from the RW model; however, none of the differences is statistically significant.
Fourth, no component of the revenue or expenditure forecasts is obviously more important
than the others for either the 1-year or 5-year cumulative projections. Hence, there appears to
be no area where the CBO could improve its overall performance by simply improving its per-
formance in a particular revenue or expenditure category.
Fifth, the CBO’s performance is significantly worse during recession years relative to non-
recession years. Hence, recessions appear to account for at least part of the CBO’s relatively poor
projection performance. However, the CBO’s budget projections are not statistically significant
from those made by the RW model during non-recession years. In a similar vein, the perfor  -
mance of the CBO relative to the simple RW does not appear to be affected by the CBO’s errors
in forecasting key economic variables.
Finally, we find no significant change in the CBO’s budget projection performance over the
past decade relative to our 2001 analysis. The CBO’s projection errors are of similar magnitude
and are just as biased as for the previous period. If past behavior is a guide to the future, our
analysis suggests that projected future deficits will likely be larger than thosecurrently projected.
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1 See Peach and Steindel (2000). It is important to note that at the time, long-run budget projections continued to show
increasingly large deficits owing to future unfunded liabilities of the federal government’s two main retirement programs
(Social Security and Medicare).
2 See Meyer (2000).
3 The CBO also presents alternative projections, but these are also dependent on scenarios that may not occur. For example,
the CBO regularly publishes projections based on the administration’s annual budget and long-term budget projections
based on alternative scenarios. Regarding the latter, see CBO (2011b).
4 The Budget Control Act of 2011 also included a $2.1 trillion extension of the Treasury debt ceiling. See CBO (2011a).
5 For the past several years, the CBO has regularly published an assessment of its economic forecasts. See, for example, the
July 2010 report (www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/115xx/doc11553/ForecastingAccuracy.pdf).
6 Indeed, the rolling correlation coefficients in a 10-year window between the two series averaged 0.4 from 1956 to 1975 and
then –0.4 from 1976 to 2010. 
7 PAYGO was initially enacted into law in 1990 as an amendment to the Deficit Control Act. Its purpose was to ensure that new
laws changing mandatory expenditures or revenues were deficit neutral. See Heniff and Keith (2004) for a summary of vari-
ous budget reform measures.
8 The cyclically adjusted budget measure is an attempt to determine how much of the deficit/surplus is due to business cycle
effects that raise or lower outlays and revenues. For a discussion of the methodology, see CBO (2008).
9 Most economists believe that the burden of the payroll tax (incidence) falls almost entirely on the employee.
10 The test of the statistical significance of the difference between the CBO and RW projection errors is obtained by regressing
the difference between the CBO and RW squared projection error (or absolute projection error) on a constant and testing
the hypothesis that the constant term is zero. The regression used heteroskedasticity autocorrelation-consistent estimates
of the standard error.
11 Since 1980, the National Bureau of Economic Research Business Cycle Dating Committee has, on average, announced the
date of the beginning (peak) or end (trough) of the recession nine months after the determined date of occurrence. This lag
length has varied from 6 to 12 months for these 9 episodes.
12 The results not excluding 2007-10 are larger: 3.0 percent and 2.2 percent, respectively.
13 The negative coefficient on defense spending suggests that, conditional on the other two sources of expenditure errors, the
error in defense spending reduces the total expenditure error. This result is likely a consequence of the correlation between
the errors. The correlations between DEF and MAN and DISC are 57 percent and 77 percent, respectively. In any event, as
Table 3 shows, omitting the others results in a positive correlation between errors and defense spending and total expendi-
ture errors.
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